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For us as “postmoderns,” nostalgia repeatedly, incorrigibly seems to
assume one of two forms, each disturbing and unappealing in its own way. On
one hand, there is the form with which most Americans, at least, have been
familiar for years, starting perhaps with the romanticization of the “good old
days” and the “gay Nineties” (the preferred telos of nostalgia for Henry Ford's
Greenfield Village or virtually anything Disney) and leading to the nostalgia of
the 1960s and early 1970s for the 1920s and 1930s, the later 1970s and
1980s for the 1950s, and the 1990s for the 1940s but also, strikingly, for the
1960s and 1970s. This mode of nostalgia dizzyingly both consecrates and
consumes not what Fredric Jameson labels “facts or historical realities” of the
past time that is its object but what he marks as “stereotypes, of ideas and facts
and historical realities,” as anyone who has lived to experience both a period
in its present and its reification through this mode's nostalgia machinery will
attest. Indeed, and partly because of its simplifying misconstructions of the
past period, this engineered nostalgia may target mainly those who, having
been very young children during the period or even born after it, did not live
it. Moreover, as it is brought to us or imposed on us primarily by film, televi-
sion, and the phenomenon of decade-specific Oldies radio stations, this nos-
talgia is multiply mediated.
Perhaps as a corrective to the deliberate falsifications or inadvertent
blindnesses of this form of nostalgia, nostalgia in our time also has taken the
form of minutely realized—and distinctly unsanitized—recreations of past
periods, especially the Victorian, characteristically emphasizing what earlier
representations may have ignored, glossed over, or intentionally suppressed.
The most stunning recent instance is Mike Leigh’s evocation of the milieu of
Gilbert and Sullivan in Topsy-Turvy (1999), which richly but unrelievedly
brings into relief the darknesses—morphine injections, bruised actresses, the
torture of corsets for both males and females, the gaiety and sleaze of broth-
els—that always encroached on the diverting illuminations of the Savoy
operas, with a particularity and thoroughness eschewed by (but also to some
extent unavailable to) the film’s predecessor, The Story of Gilbert and Sullivan
(1953). Of course, Leigh is not alone among those whose revisionist repre-
sentations of Victorian culture have enhanced our awareness of the period:
one might also mention the rash of recent films from the Victorian dark or
unmentionable side—The Piano, Angels and Insects, Oscar and Lucinda, The
Governess—along with Public Television’s The 1900 House, which within its
first 30 minutes, notably lingers on the horrors of having to do laundry with
a mangle and zooms in on the technique of fabricating sanitary napkins from
rag cloth.
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Though it would be unfair to suggest that either of these prevailing forms
of nostalgia, especially the second, is not culturally revealing or perversely
reassuring, even necessary for us, it can be argued that neither form deeply
engages and interrogates the dynamics of nostalgia and the recollection that
always accompanies it. That is, both forms of nostalgia present us with or,
rather, plunge us into representations of the past period that we experience
and evaluate without necessarily reflecting on what nostalgia as a mode of
consciousness can or cannot accomplish. Refreshingly, Ann Colley’s study,
Nostalgia and Recollection in Victorian Culture, aims to do just that, to develop
an understanding of the critical and constructive roles nostalgia and recollec-
tion come to play in the thought and experience of Victorian writers—
Darwin, Ruskin, Pater, Gaskell, and preeminently Robert Louis Stevenson—
and artists such as Ford Madox Brown and J. M. W. Turner. Through a series
of close and extremely scrupulous readings of the verbal and visual works that
arise, at least in part, from the homesickness and longing for return that nos-
talgia denotes, Colley argues that for these figures “nostalgia is a significantly
more complicated experience than the easy utterance of the word usually
allows. Theirs is not a response that primarily trivializes, simplifies and mis-
represents a former time; instead, their writing toward home is an event that
brings into itself all the intricacies of the nostalgic experience” (4). Colley
wants to show that nostalgia emerges as “an organizing force in the imagina-
tion and memory,” one that allows those who move into it to “create new
maps” (ibid.).
Take the case of Charles Darwin, with which Colley opens her book.
Darwin left England on the H.M.S. Beagle in December 1832. Colley suggests
that, although he was far from immune to the predictable and commonplace
experiences of homesickness and longing for England during the voyage,
Darwin crucially turned the tendencies of nostalgia toward helping to struc-
ture his scientific thought. Darwin’s retrospections ground his perceptions of
what is at hand in his observations; flora and fauna are referred to English
flora and fauna, landscapes newly encountered to familiar English landscapes:
“The nostalgic eye that turns to regard what is left behind cannot help but
indulge comparison and let the past emerge as the legitimizing referent” (16).
Against this structuring capacity of memory, however, nostalgia also imposes
the threat of forgetfulness, which Darwin faces continually as he encounters
new phenomena: “Darwin fears that the accumulating richness and variety of
what he sees in his travels will stifle remembrance. Like the multitude of white
butterflies that early in the voyage surround the Beagle and with their dense
splendor block the view, the plethora of images threatens to hinder his
remembrance of what has gone by and will pass before him” (19).
Accordingly, Darwin envies the Argentinian gauchos, who can fill in a “whole
history” from a horse’s tracks and thereby “obstruct forgetfulness’s intrusion”
and close the gap between residual signs and their absent, past referents (21).
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Yet, precisely because he is attuned to its eroding potential, forgetfulness also
enables Darwin to recollect what is essential: “the spaces created by the peri-
ods of forgetfulness between nostalgic episodes make it possible to filter mem-
ory to reveal what is important and powerful” (25). Darwin’s scientific drive
and duty to identify, classify, and label specimens eventually will confer an
aura on the objects of his study, make them signs of what Darwin experienced:
“Through nostalgia’s perspective, the single butterfly isolated in a case absorbs
into itself its former complicated and amazing habitat” (26), without that
environment’s contingent distractions. As counter to the enervating force asso-
ciated with homesickness in travelers from Odysseus on, Darwin’s nostalgia
“seems to have spurred his sensitivity both to oblivion and its attendant ques-
tions,” so that Darwin’s reactions to the experience of nostalgia make him
proactive in his critical scientific work: “As if laying stepping stones across the
River Lethe, he places names on each item and secures what otherwise might
fade and disappear” (22).
The writer’s situation between  an escaping past and a future that threat-
ens memory’s erosion is one in which Stevenson, even more acutely and per-
vasively than Darwin, repeatedly found himself. Indeed, from the more than
three full chapters Colley devotes to Stevenson one might conclude that
Stevenson was “at home” only in nostalgia, so much do vivid memories of his
past in Scotland and particularly his childhood there inform the present of his
writing. Colley shows this is true not only of the last years of his life, the peri-
od from 1888 to his death in Samoa in 1894, during which time Stevenson
never returned to Scotland, or, indeed, left the Pacific, but also of his life before
that voluntary exile. A wonderful chapter on A Child’s Garden of Verses (1884)
suggests that the telos of Stevenson’s yearning was not simply a specific time or
place but a certain freedom of being; as Colley puts it, when Stevenson “wished
to be released from the dualities inherent in the experience of the present, he
often turned his attention to the absorbing spaces of his childhood and
attempted to re-enter their flexible and synthetic landscape” (107), a landscape
evoked in many of the poems, whenever the child-speaker, however physi-
cally confined, imagines himself as part of what Colley calls the “ubiquitous”
body of the child, freely moving into spaces and beings far from the immedi-
ate. One should note that Stevenson “went” to Treasure Island (1883) well
before he went to the South Seas, and that the book’s adventure elaborates
from Stevenson’s imaginary play on a treasure map he drew one “rainy high-
land day” in “Miss M’Gregor’s cottage” (161). Stevenson imagines Treasure
Island from Scotland, as he will later, conversely, imagine Scotland from
Samoa. The two locales converge, for instance, in an 1893 letter to Sidney
Colvin, which Colley quotes: “It pours with rain from the westward, very
unusual kind of weather; I was standing out on the little veranda [at Vailima]
in front of my room this morning, and there went through me or over me a
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heave of extraordinary and apparently baseless emotion. I literally staggered.
And then the explanation came, and I knew I had found a frame of mind and
body that belonged to Scotland, and particularly to the neighbourhood of
Callander” (66). As much as Stevenson obviously enjoyed the islands, and as
much as he needed their climate for his health, he could never experience the
present of Samoa without vestiges—and literally vestments—of his Scottish
past, as Colley pointedly notes: Stevenson “imported thirty-seven cases of fur-
niture and belongings from his houses in Bournemouth and Edinburgh and
placed them in Vailima, his home in Samoa. The chairs, tables, and silver ser-
vices from Skerryvore and 17 Heriot Row stood as incongruously in the light
of the tropical sun as did the Samoan servants who, under Stevenson’s orders,
on Sundays and other holidays, dressed in striped blazers and Royal Stewart
Tartan skirts (an adaptation of the Samoan lava-lavas)” (61).
Interestingly, Stevenson’s fondness for retrospection does not seem to
have blinded him but rather to have sharpened his sensitivity to seeing. Colley
acknowledges that Stevenson’s nostalgia could lead him to the sometimes fal-
sifying abstraction of nationalism; his “yearning for the people and the land-
scape of home frequently turned into composite expressions of nationalism
that abridged or obstructed rather than separated experience,” appearing to
dissolve the dualities that retrospection entails (64). Yet she also points out
that Stevenson’s experience of recollection more typically tended to the com-
plex, one train of thought crossing another, leaving him uncomfortable with
others’ less qualified patriotic expressions: “Stevenson readily acknowledged
the Janus-like glances of the nostalgic moment and simultaneously engaged
what is and what was or recalled what had been both painful and blissful, ter-
rifying and golden” (55). Stevenson’s remembered world of childhood, for
instance, is not merely idyllic; it is marked also by an enjoyment of vicarious
violence, as Colley notes.
For Stevenson, recollection is “not merely a looking back; it is also a com-
mitment to a particular way of seeing” (157), which, if honest seeing, usually
involves ambivalences, ambiguities, dualities, contradictions. Colley illus-
trates Stevenson’s complex ways of seeing in a remarkable section that lists
and analyzes the optical metaphors to which Stevenson habitually turned: the
magic lantern, the kaleidoscope, the mirror and, most intriguingly to me, the
thaumatrope (an “apparatus . . . composed of a card with different pictures on
opposite sides which when twirled rapidly, with the aid of strings, combined
to form a single image”) (168). All of these devices share a reliance on the con-
trast of differences—between absence and presence, light and darkness, one
image and the next—inherent in nostalgia but also, as it turns out, in the act
of figured writing: the thaumatrope “brings both sides—the image that is pre-
sent and the one that is absent—into view. It does something analogous to
metaphor, for through its oscillation it brings what is near together with what
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is elsewhere and creates a kind of synthesis which otherwise is unavailable”
(170). In other words, the instruments Stevenson uses to talk about retro-
spection again reveal nostalgic vision to be complicating and creative.
If Colley’s book went no further than to illuminate how nostalgia and rec-
ollection shape consciousness and writing in figures like Darwin and
Stevenson, it would be valuable. Intriguingly, however, Colley follows the
threads of nostalgia’s tendencies into more potentially controversial theoreti-
cal regions, notably in the chapter entitled “Rooms without Mirrors: The
Childhood Interiors of Ruskin, Pater, and Stevenson.” Colley  focuses here on
three writers who, in trying to “re-enter the rooms of their youth, . . . dwell
not only upon their idiosyncratic relationship to the interiors of their child-
hood but also upon how a consciousness of one’s physical being defines the
sense of one’s surroundings” (124). Not surprisingly, these writers’ reflections
reveal a distinction between how the child experiences these spaces and how
the adult reflects upon them; indeed, it is reflection precisely that is necessary
to the adult but not the child. More surprising is Colley’s observation that in
all three writers’ descriptions of childhood spaces, the “mirror’s reflecting and
revealing eye is notably absent, for the child in their texts does not require its
integrating attendance—its way of digesting and making complete the area
and contents of a room, its way of bringing interiors and exteriors togeth-
er. . . . The child does not need to see its image in the mirror to gain a sense
of totality, to understand, rightly or wrongly, a feeling of coherence, and espe-
cially to develop a sense of self that distinguishes it from others” (138). It is
only the reflecting adult who has need of the mirror to recapture and repre-
sent the child: the writers “must pick up the looking glass of their autobio-
graphical texts in an attempt to re-integrate or reclaim themselves” (143); the
childhood spaces evoked in those texts are ones into which the subject/body
is welcomed, received, integrated, absorbed, rather than one from which it is
distanced or alienated.
One thing this suggests to Colley is that the childhood domains evoked
by Ruskin, Pater, and Stevenson are ones in which the laws of Lacan’s stade du
miroir (mirror stage) expressly do not apply: “for these children, the mirror,
whether real or metaphoric/symbolic, is not the necessary attendant to their
sense of identity and relation” and the “subsequent work to reclaim a whole-
ness that the reflected image has divided is irrelevant. Their embeddedness in
themselves and their interiors obviates that necessity. In their youth, because
they are not spectators of themselves, the mirror is not a factor in their rela-
tionship with themselves, their rooms, and with others around them. It is sim-
ply not present” (143). While Colley’s point cannot be taken as a refutation of
Lacan, it does amount to a strong qualifier: through the eyes of the child
Ruskin, Pater, or Stevenson, what Lacan calls the “Imaginary”—the realm in
which the child richly experiences his body but not as an alienated entity or
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one that has its integrity and coherence outside himself, as is the case in
Lacan’s mirror stage—persists well into childhood, if it is not fully the condi-
tion of childhood. Though they experience the body and its surrounding
spaces diversely, Colley’s child subjects all have a reassuring imaginative
access to them that is not available to Lacan’s children after a very early age
and is decidedly not available to any adults save through the mirror of retro-
spection. The world as the child is imagined to experience it thus becomes
implicitly from Colley’s perspective a category of consciousness that develops
in opposition to the split subjectivity that Lacan sees as inevitably the human
situation and that Colley sees as the situation more exclusively of the retro-
spective adult writer, who needs the mirror as Perseus needs his shield. The
“text’s deflecting mirror protects [these writers] from an unmediated con-
frontation with their former selves. . . . Like nostalgia itself, this mirror keeps
them away from a direct sighting of the past, and, through that act, prevents
what lives in their memory from dying” (148). Colley’s contention that the
autobiographical writers need the aid and protection of the mirror implies the
formidable autonomy and force of the remembered against what is present.
One trick of the sort of falsifying nostalgia we are prone to and that Colley
develops her understanding of nostalgia against is to romanticize past times
and places. Colley’s two chapters centering on visual arts subtly register the
degrees to which the artist’s techniques and chosen subject focus can mask the
expression of the exiles’ loss. Colley contrasts, for instance, Ford Madox
Brown’s The Last of England (1855) with Richard Redgrave’s The Emigrants’ Last
Sight of Home (1858), showing the latter to be much more a view of home
through rose-colored glasses than the former, which Colley aptly compares to
the double images designed for viewing through a stereoscope, but that, in the
painting’s case, fail to converge or synthesize. The emigrants’ experience as
Brown conveys it is one of cold disconnection between figures—notably hus-
band and wife—and obsessive fragmentation, as opposed to the warm, reas-
suring, but finally false “farewell embrace” depicted in Redgrave’s painting.
Though Brown’s painting confronts the disorientation of its subjects in a way
Redgrave’s does not, Colley sees both paintings as falling short of what might
be called a “full” representation of the emptiness of loss. To suggest what the
paintings do not accomplish, Colley includes a discussion of Ovid’s Tristia,
poems written from his exile, which, though jarringly outside the period of
her book’s focus, works to suggest what a less compromised portrayal of loss
is like.
For Colley, the workings of memory through visual art are more tellingly
revealed in the evolution of the etching-engravings of J.M.W. Turner, to which
she devotes most of her book’s closing chapter. Colley follows Ruskin in want-
ing to show that “Turner, ‘assuredly’ more than most artists, consciously and
unconsciously beckoned remembrance to initiate, develop and modify his
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pictures’ images”; that Turner “recollected rather than imagined his composi-
tions,” and that “his prints, therefore, do not replicate a factual accuracy; they
portray, instead, the impressions of memory” (197). It is as if Turner uses
memories of images or image-motifs to fill out, improve, or revise the repre-
senting picture. As Colley quotes Bergson, Turner’s process is an instance of
memory’s “gnawing itself” into the present and the future and developing into
active recollection: “involuntary remembrances” are allowed to “modify the
more consciously recalled and reworked images” (194, 199). Interestingly,
Colley shows how details that initially appear on the prints’ margins work
themselves into prominence as the engravings are revised, and this increasing
stress on the peripheral, of course, reveals the true machinery of memory:
“The resilience of the marginal pieces reminds one that a remembrance of
something often elevates or emphasizes what had in the initial experience
seemed less important. . . . These moments can unseat the dominant image”
(201).
As engaging as Colley shows the operations of nostalgia and recollection
to be in the thought and work of her subjects, one comes away from her book
with the clear impression that nostalgia works exceptionally in exceptional
thinkers. She does not at all argue that the falsifying and limiting modes of
nostalgia mentioned at the outset of this writing were not operative in
Victorian culture, and she certainly acknowledges nostalgia’s lures toward sen-
timentality for the Victorians. That comes across most clearly in her chapter
on Elizabeth Gaskell’s fiction, where, through an argument amply supported
with evidence from the full range of Gaskell’s works, Colley shows that many
of Gaskell’s characters, though certainly prone to nostalgia and longing for a
world outside the alienating, disconcerting, frenetically changing urban envi-
ronments in which they find themselves, have or develop the capacity to “cre-
ate new maps” for themselves. Gaskell does not minimize the disorienting,
disturbing facts of her characters’ lives, but she also shows their resourceful-
ness and resilience in enlisting their powers of memory and awareness that
things have been and can be other than they are to negotiate the present.
Crucially for Colley’s argument, Gaskell did not sentimentalize or yield to the
illusive attractions of the English pastoral idyll, as Colley shows the painter
Helen AIlingham did, repeatedly and profitably, in her charming but sanitized
depictions of country cottages where “smoke curls reassuringly from the
chimney” (80). Gaskell and her strong characters typically resist such senti-
mentality, though the contemporary appeal of paintings like Allingham’s and,
one must say, portions of Dickens’ fiction, which Colley does not discuss,
leaves one with the uneasy feeling that the Victorians were as ready as we are
to give in to a nostalgia that is narcotic rather than stimulating, cozy rather
than challenging. The strength of Colley’s book is not that it shows how vul-
nerable Victorians were to the “golden glow” of the past, as humans of all time
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are, but how particular thinkers were able to struggle with nostalgia, like
Odysseus in his bonds before the Sirens’ lure, and wrest from recollection cre-
ative ways to construe and construct the present and future.
William A. Kumbier
Missouri Southern State College
The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy by Cristina Lafont, translated by
José Medina. Cambridge, Mass., and London, England: The MIT Press, 1999.
Pp. xviii + 377. $45.00.
With The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy Cristina Lafont con-
fronts both Anglo-American and German reflections on language. According
to Lafont, even though critics tend to stress the differences between the two
traditions, with the German tradition analyzing natural languages and empha-
sizing language as a means of understanding (not just as a vehicle of knowl-
edge), both traditions lead to similar problems, such as linguistic relativism.
Reopening the classic question of reason's relation to language, Lafont tries to
put an end to extreme forms of linguistic relativism and linguistic reification,
which she sees as dangerous, but not necessary, results of “the linguistic turn.”
In fact, she repeatedly emphasizes that her agenda is to “preserve the linguistic
turn while nevertheless calling into question . . . the thesis that meaning determines
reference” (225). The author analyzes the linguistic turn in the German tradi-
tion of the philosophy of language to critique and extend Habermas's theory
of communicative rationality. In an effort to defend a workable theory of com-
municative rationality, she argues that language has both a “world-disclosing
function,” a constitutive role in our interpretive experiences of objective and
subjective worlds, and a “referential function,” a capacity enabling us to refer
to an objective world independently of our different interpretations of that
world. In spite of a tendency to repeat herself, Lafont has written a significant
contribution to the ongoing debates concerning meaning and reference.
According to Lafont, the linguistic turn in the German tradition of the
philosophy of language begins in the “Hamann-Herder-Humboldt” tradition,
a tradition that emphasizes the “world-disclosing” function of language. A
shared thesis of this tradition is that “linguistic expressions are held to deter-
mine, if not what there is, at least what there can be for a linguistic communi-
ty—what such a community can say (i.e., believe) that there is” (xii); in other
words, for writers in this tradition, meaning determines reference. If so,
Lafont asks, how can we gain knowledge about reality? Her answer is that lan-
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guage can take us beyond what we believe because it can refer. If a particular
description of a referent turns out to be wrong, she claims, we can learn from
our mistakes and change our description. Indeed, by developing what she
calls (borrowing terminology from Hilary Putnam) an “internal realist” strate-
gy, Lafont hopes to retain a realist perspective, which emphasizes normative
elements in our cognitive actions, within a pragmatist strategy, which empha-
sizes interpretive and creative elements in those actions.
Starting with Hamann, Lafont shows how the German tradition takes
issue with the classical instrumental view of language as a mere tool for des-
ignating independently existing objects; language does not supply names that
designate such objects. In Lafont’s account, the German tradition believes that
language constitutes thought. From this perspective, we cannot even think
without being involved in an already given language, and we can critique any
philosophy of consciousness that elevates reason to a transcendental state (for
reason cannot be removed from and cannot come before language). In turn,
Lafont critiques the “Hamann-Herder-Humboldt” tradition, showing how the
thesis that meaning determines reference leads to the reification of language.
In other words, she claims that once words designate concepts instead of
independent objects, when all reference is indirect, the function of language
is reduced to its constitutive character, its “world-disclosing” function. In
short, language’s “referential” function gets lost.
Lafont argues that Heidegger and Gadamer sustain the thesis that mean-
ing determines reference, with Heidegger placing language’s world-disclosing
function before its pragmatic aspects. Gadamer continues the hermeneutic
focus on the world-disclosing function of language, but, for Lafont, Gadamer
provides a complex model of conversation absent in the work of his prede-
cessors. As Lafont explains, the “understanding toward which a conversation
is directed is always an understanding with someone and about something” (97).
In this hermeneutic sense, we leave ourselves open to another person’s claim,
and if understanding is possible in a particular situation, there is a presuppo-
sition of solidarity. In Lafont’ s analysis, if we stress the social character of lan-
guage, the defining feature of language becomes intersubjectivity; that is, peo-
ple participate in the activity of language, an activity that is part of a complex
dialogic process of understanding.
The first section of the book, comprising some one hundred pages, pro-
vides a clear, readable narrative of what Lafont sees as the main features of the
German tradition of the philosophy of language. Moreover, this section pro-
vides Lafont with a historical background against which to situate Habermas’s
conceptions of language, conceptions that Lafont explicates and critiques for
the rest of her book. Lafont is determined to give both the communicative
dimension and the cognitive dimension of language their due; indeed, she
consistently refers to her central argument that we should no longer defend
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the reification of language as world-disclosure. Instead, she argues for the use
of current theories of “direct reference” to bring the designative (“referential”)
function of language back into play. Accordingly, Lafont finds in Habermas’s
later thought a dialectic “between an intersubjectivity to be produced through
communication, and an intersubjectivity always already produced, thanks to
the ‘lifeworld’ shared by speakers” (126). From this perspective, she main-
tains, we can acknowledge that our relationship with the world is symboli-
cally mediated.
Lafont deftly shows how Habermas continues to rely on hermeneutic
premises (from Gadamer); however, when she asserts Habermas’s differences
from Gadamer, she overstates the case a bit. For example, she claims that
Habermas “simply underscores the reflective and critical potential of the
communication oriented toward understanding, a potential entirely disre-
garded by Gadamer” (137). Here, the word “entirely” does not cohere with her
own more sophisticated analysis of Gadamer given in the book’s first section.
But Lafont also usefully takes us through many years of Habermas’s writings
and shows how his reliance on a “lifeworld,” a holistic concept of shared pre-
suppositions, does not appear to agree with some of his other more univer-
salist claims. In other words, Lafont’s agenda is to show how a hermeneutic
component to Habermas’s philosophy cannot account for how we understand
the meaning of what someone says. For example, Lafont claims, Habermas
presumes that we share implied background knowledge that we cannot
reduce to propositions; but because we cannot formalize this holistic knowl-
edge, then counter to Habermas’s intent, we cannot isolate “the acceptability
conditions of speech acts from the background knowledge that determines
these conditions and thus makes possible the understanding of speech acts”
(223).
Lafont uses the issue of learning as a limit case to test her strategy: can a
philosophy of language explain how we learn through language? To accom-
plish this task, she analyzes the referential and cognitive use of language to
show how language contains within itself the possibility of revising itself (so
we can change, learn, and correct previous knowledge). After much abstrac-
tion intended to show how referential uses contain possibilities of revisibility,
Lafont moves to specific examples in her lively and clear examination of K.
Donnellan’s distinction between “attributive” and “referential” uses of definite
descriptions. An “attributive” description is essential for doing something; it
is irreplaceable. A “referential” description is but one of many ways to accom-
plish the same job. For Lafont, Donnellan’s distinction helps us understand
that the classic theory of reference only applies to the “attributive” use. In the
act of redescribing something, hearers can agree to the existence of the refer-
ent, but disagree about the specific way the speaker describes that referent; a
theory of indirect reference cannot, Lafont asserts, account for this possibility.
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In order to learn, we must have the possibility for cognitive disagreement; we
must learn the referential use of language.
Lafont relies heavily on the writings of Hilary Putnam to explain her ideas
of reference, revisibility, and learning. When she analyzes the Anglo-American
tradition though, she extends Habermas’s conceptions of language and com-
municative rationality without thoroughly engaging the other figures of
German philosophy she analyzed in the first section of her book. That is, the
book’s title, which emphasizes “hermeneutic philosophy,” might be mislead-
ing to readers who expect more direct comparisons between Putnam and, say,
Heidegger and Gadamer. In the preface to the English edition, Lafont herself
states that she “added a new, third part . . . [which] entails passing outside the
domain of the philosophy of language” (xviii). Perhaps this explains why a
potentially fascinating contrast between Gadamer and Humboldt is left to
fewer than two paragraphs (267).
Lafont does, however, provide a useful exposition of Putnam, who
argues, among other things, that so-called natural kind terms are not defin-
able. For example, a three-legged tiger is still a tiger (what matters is that the
three-legged tiger might be an abnormal member of the class “tigers,” but it is
still a “tiger”). Unlike the traditional theory of reference, which “seems to ren-
der scientific progress [revisibility] impossible” (260), a new theory of refer-
ence needs to deal with revisable descriptions. Lafont claims that we can
defend Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality by developing a strat-
egy of “internal realism” from a pragmatist point of view—that is, showing
how the “referential” function of language already has a built-in capacity for
rationality.
Lafont turns to Habermas’s discourse ethics to deal with the problem of
justification, for discourse ethics “only explains the conditions under which
alone those criteria (arguments, reasons, and the like) can achieve justificatory
force” (319). In other words, in a discursive situation, we can only infer the
correctness of our claims based on whether they are convincing or not; we are
justified in following the “unforced force of the better argument.” Lafont thus
adopts the position that we cannot explain truth or moral rightness in so-
called epistemic terms because while discourse ethics does try to provide
absolute criteria for creating morally right norms, it does not provide us with
substantive content. Instead, discourse ethics tries to explain the internal rela-
tion between rational acceptability and moral rightness. Realist (or “referen-
tial”) presuppositions, as Lafont explains the case, have no “epistemic” con-
tent. If we follow her interpretation of Habermas’s thought, Lafont asserts
that we can acquire a useful rule of argumentation; there is no guarantee (no
sufficient condition) for moral rightness itself. From this perspective, ratio-
nal acceptability is thus a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for moral
rightness.
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The drive to defend Habermas’s position again appears when Lafont’s own
language places into the margins issues that might otherwise be quite signifi-
cant to her topic; indeed, at times, the footnotes toward the end of the book
overwhelm the print on top of the page. For example, a discussion of Rawls’s
theory of justice appears in detailed footnotes on pages 344-47; Lafont
records Habermas’s own remarks on Rawls in the body of her text, but the
footnotes on these four pages compete for position and significance with the
(proportionally smaller) text on top of the page. It is unclear why such an
interesting discussion of sufficient criteria for justice in Rawls does not belong
in the main text of Lafont’s book.
In the larger argument of the book, however, Lafont’s point is that “(dis-
cursive) rational acceptability is the only acceptable necessary condition for
moral justification” (347). Lafont arrives at this claim by relying on a number
of either/or postulations. As Lafont states, by “using the oppositions true/false
or morally right/morally wrong (just/unjust), we thereby commit ourselves to
accepting that the statement at issue is either true or false, that the norm is
either just or unjust” (350). At such moments, we might want to know how the
Continental figures discussed in the earlier parts of her book (or a poststruc-
turalist) might respond. We can sense, however, that Lafont needs to articu-
late these positions in precisely this way (binary notions with a single right
answer) so she can show how a “realist strategy can make ethical pluralism
compatible with moral universalism” (351). Here, Lafont again relies on
Putnam, who claims that seemingly “incompatible words may actually
describe the same situation or event or the same physical system” (353). What
different sentences, different interpretations, have in common is reference
(“the same situation”). Thus, we can have epistemic pluralism without neces-
sarily having relativism; there are different descriptions, but they are of the
“the same event.” A presupposition here, as Lafont acknowledges, is that there
are certain common, generalizable interests among all human beings—what is
“equally in everyone’s interest.” Since, according to Lafont, there appear to be
such generalizable interests, we can “in principle find norms able to preserve
these interests” (359).
Although at times Lafont’s own abstract language and penchant for
lengthy quotations interfere with the presentation of her argument, by the end
of the book she has explicated multiple traditions for the benefit of her larger
argument and has asked us to remember that no matter how much we need
language to understand our world, we should not neglect the reality of the
world that is not language. Lafont writes best when she has a story to tell.
Moshe Gold
Fordham University
372 Criticism Vol. 42  No. 3: Book Reviews
Closed Encounters: Literary Politics and Public Culture by Jeffrey Wallen.
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998. Pp. 232. $47.95 cloth;
$18.75 paper.
On October 27, 1992 in Paris, as part of one of the many speeches that
the much admired intellectual-politician-playwright Vàclav Havel was invited
to give after the fall of communism and his simultaneous rise as a leading pub-
lic figure, the former Czech president chose to talk about “the phenomenon
of waiting”:
There are different ways of waiting.
At one end of the great spectrum there is waiting for Godot, who
embodies universal salvation. For many of us who lived in the com-
munist world, waiting was something very close to this extreme posi-
tion. (. . .) But Godot—at least as one who is expected—will not
come, because he simply doesn’t exist. He only represents hope. He
is not hope itself, but an illusion. He is the product of our own help-
lessness, a patch over a hole in the spirit. The patch itself is full of
holes. It is the hope of people without hope.
On the other end of the spectrum there is waiting of another
kind: that is, patience. For us this waiting was based on the knowl-
edge that it made sense on principle to resist by speaking the truth
simply because it was the right thing to do, without speculating
whether it would lead somewhere tomorrow, or the day after, or ever.
(. . .) It also, of course, grew out of the faith—but this is of secondary
importance—that a seed once sown would one day take root and
send forth a shoot. No one knew when. But it would happen some-
day, perhaps for future generations.
This stance—for simplicity’s sake, let us call it the dissident
stance—assumed and cultivated patience. It taught us how to wait.
It taught us waiting as patience, waiting as a state of hope, not as an
expression of hopelessness. Whereas waiting for Godot is a mean-
ingless form of self-deception and therefore a waste of time, this sec-
ond type of waiting does have meaning; it is not a sweet lie but a bit-
ter truth, and time spent in this kind of waiting is not wasted. To wait
until good seeds sprout is not the same as waiting for Godot. Waiting
for Godot means waiting for lilies we have never planted to grow.
I should make it clear that citizens of the communist world
could not be divided into dissidents and those who merely waited
for Godot. To a certain extent, all of us waited for Godot at times,
and at other times were dissidents. It’s just that some of us might
have been more the former, and others more the latter.
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Nevertheless, this experience can be simplified to the recognition
that there are different kinds of waiting. (Václav Havel, The Art of the
Impossible: Politics as Morality in Practice, trans. Paul Wilson et al.
[New York: Fromm International, 1998], 103-5.)
Note how the reader has precisely to wait until the last paragraph to hear what
the truth is about the two kinds of waiting person: the one who waits pas-
sively and the other who waits while actively repeating (an unspecified) truth.
The truth is, Havel insists (“I should make it clear”), that it is unclear now, as
it presumably was back then, before 1989, just who the bad and good “wait-
ers” were: who was wasting time and who was nobly pursuing a patient exer-
cise of truth? Is this a case of undecidability? Certainly Havel teaches us to
acknowledge different kinds of waiting, but he himself admits that his dis-
tinction is of only limited usefulness in judging specific cases (“It’s just that
some of us might have been more the former, and others more the latter”).
One could say more about this short dissertation on waiting, or about
Havel’s prestige (like Frederick Douglass’s or Primo Levi’s) as survivor and wit-
ness, about his choice to address these remarks to a French audience in late
October of 1992, or his reasons for speaking of lilies and not, say, daffodils or
tulips. One of the most able commentators of this textual event would be
Jeffrey Wallen and next in line would be an attentive, patient reader of his
book, Closed Encounters: Literary Politics and Public Culture. Wallen’s Godot is
good (i.e., genuine, honest, frank, critical, etc.) dialogue. Waiting for good dia-
logue, he says, has become the favorite activity (or passivity) of many Western
politicians, journalists, and university professors who have no better idea of
how to address the “breakdown in other forms of community, citizenship, and
public involvement.” Wallen sends the reader who cannot come up with his
own examples of this breakdown to Christopher Lasch’s account in The Revolt
of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy and adds this remark that recalls
Havel’s characterization of waiting for Godot as “a patch over a hole in the
spirit”: “Dialogue is being proffered as the new social glue, delivered to us
through the pronouncements of politicians and media spokesmen, the ‘repre-
sentatives’ of the people. It is more difficult—and more essential—to confront
the holes in the social fabric that dialogue cannot repair” (180). Wallen teach-
es his reader to recognize different proponents of dialogue and among them
those whose calls for good dialogue dodge more substantive, nondiscursive
social issues and who procrastinate when it comes to thinking through and
perhaps improving their own speech acts. A call for “good dialogue” or “gen-
uine debate” or “reasoning together” is invoked “as a future endpoint, [that]
gets everyone off the hook: it offers both a legitimation (everything we do is
leading toward it) and an excuse (I don’t have to do it yet)” (151). Through
careful and calm examinations of numerous examples taken from the essays
and speeches of eminent professors in the humanities and other well-known
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“public intellectuals” (e.g., Stanley Fish, Gerald Graff, Richard Rorty, Edward
Said, Cornel West) Wallen reminds the reader of the old saying that “talk is
cheap” and so is preaching to the converted (hence the choice of title, Closed
Encounters, and the title of part three: “Failed Encounters: Dialogue or
Chatter?”). 
Wallen ranges over a daunting amount and variety of textual terrain (a
bibliography of works cited, if there were one, would be very long), but  his
talent for defining the issue at hand and delimiting its treatment with well-
chosen excerpts from the texts in question allows the reader to get the lay of
the land and understand where the cruces are. Wallen is an excellent guide.
He makes an effort to practice what he preaches, which is  “thinking publicly—
to think in ways that could sustain, rather than foreclose or discredit, a pub-
lic discourse” (68). He does not go in for spouting or scolding from afar (like
Thoreau), nor does he think the mass of men are necessarily dupes or des-
perate. Wallen does not patronize, or practice exclusionary fetishization of the
difficult; nor, however, is he spoon-feeding or simplifying the complexity,
when it arises, of the issues at hand. In a chapter entitled “Forging a Public
Voice for Academic Critics” Wallen praises the exemplary career of the
Victorian public intellectual T. H. Huxley, and later, perhaps still thinking of
Huxley or of other hybrid thinkers (Emerson? Dewey? Orwell? Virginia
Woolf?), he remarks, “It is much easier to treat others as incapable of under-
standing than to actively engage their ideas: to open one’s own thoughts as
fully as possible to the scrutiny of others requires a high degree of clarity and
of courage” (184). By refusing easy side-taking, as well as hand-wringing and
fence-sitting, Wallen shows that clarity and courage can pay off.
Who is this book for? In the words of the author, it is “[f]or anyone who
has been away from academia for the last ten or twenty years” (97); but it
may also be of interest to academics working outside the Anglo-American
context (especially since American problems have a way of becoming other
people’s problems), as well as to North American academics (whether in the
arts or sciences) who may have abandoned all hope of “keeping up” with the
acute and chronic issues of higher education (either out of disgust, exhaus-
tion, or bewilderment). Magazines and newspapers routinely make easy
money with sensational stories that mock or fume at the scandalous (pornog-
raphy in the classroom?), alarmist (the university in ruins?), and bizarre
(Latino professor denied tenure for not being Latino enough?) sides of
American higher education, and they make it easy to turn off and tune out
until the next story (necessarily more outrageous than the last) comes along.
Wallen tries to articulate higher expectations for critical thinking and discus-
sion of the functions and purposes of the university, and he discourages rac-
ing from fire to fire to do damage control with verbal extinguishers that evade
or misrepresent real problems and blame or belittle the messengers. He wants
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instead “to put forward questions that will haunt incessantly the conscious-
ness of academic critics” (14) and of ordinary citizens outside the academy.
What are the issues Wallen addresses? Perhaps the three most important
are the fallout from postmodern challenges to traditional beliefs about truth,
objectivity, and the protocols of reasonable argument; the rescue and revenge
of marginality; and the fetishization of “diversity,” “otherness,” and “resis-
tance.” Wallen’s standard procedure is to trace the development of each issue,
point out its vexing challenges, expose the weak arguments or blank asser-
tions of some of the key players in these debates, and state as precisely as he
can what his own position is, and is not (the guardrail formula “I do not mean
to suggest that . . .” and other similar expressions occur frequently over the
course of the book). After reading Wallen, the academic and the “common
reader” alike can both understand, for example, how a displacement of New
Critical beliefs in “cognitive literary criticism” in favor of the pragmatist and
reader response “sensitivity” to “interpretive communities” and the “con-
structedness” of truth could make classroom and parliamentary virtues such
as “disinterestedness” or “objectivity” seem quaint if not pernicious. One can
better understand how in the same year (1996) a talented professor at the
Université de Montréal (Bill Readings) signs his diagnosis of higher education,
The University in Ruins, with calls for a “dissensual community” of individuals
as “singularities” instead of subjects; while five hours to the south, former
Dartmouth ColIege president James 0. Freedman smiles out from the cover of
his neo-humanist celebration Idealism and Liberal Education in which, along
with praise for the heroic achievements of Václav Havel and other stars, he
rather airily promotes the college’s “commitment to diversity” which he envi-
sions as “a symphony of different persons, different cultures, different tradi-
tions, and different languages . . . pursuing differences and otherness in all of
their varied dimensions” (63). The general reader also ends up better
informed about the still simmering controversies over “political correctness,”
“culture wars, and “identity politics” about which Wallen (like Havel) tells us
some of his character-building, firsthand experience.
At the end of the third and final part of the book, Wallen reiterates
his “expectations” (perhaps not quite the same thing as “hopes”):
It is a daunting but important task to create more spaces that encour-
age both critical thinking and dialogues that go beyond a mere stat-
ing of each person’s views. . . . The dynamics of any social space
depend greatly on the expectations we bring to our interactions with
others. Academic critics play an important role in crafting what we
expect from discussion. Not only do acts of criticism diagnose the
perturbations and significant features of our discursive fields, but
they always also shape the array of possible responses. (193)
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And yet, Wallen refuses to offer his own model of good dialogue in the con-
cluding section (“Troubling the Horizon”) of the last chapter, “The Poverty of
Conversation” a section which follows “Bite Size Discussions” in which Wallen
challenges warm-fuzzy views of Socratic dialogue: “Socratic dialogue has noth-
ing to do with an equal exchange of opinion” (224). “I will not propose my own
model,” he says, “since I am not convinced that criticism, philosophy, or rig-
orous thinking are necessarily compatible with a model of dialogue” (177).
May one conclude, then, that Wallen is still open to persuasion since he has
not said that they are necessarily incompatible either? Perhaps. Is Wallen wait-
ing for good dialogue? Yes, but he’s not holding his breath.
C. Jon Delogu
Université de Toulouse-Le Mirail
The Arts and Sciences of Criticism edited by David Fuller and Patricia Waugh.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.  Pp. x + 265.  $39.95.
As the editors explain in their introduction, the essays in The Arts and
Sciences of Criticism all “are in some way about what kind of knowledge liter-
ature is or claims (implicitly) to be” (1), and they also all reflect “on a debate
between different models of knowledge—a science model and its place in the
university versus other ways of conceiving knowledge for which the arts have
traditionally been seen as vehicles but which the science model makes cur-
rently problematic” (1).  At a time when the coherence and the mission of the
university are very much in doubt when the humanities are widely seen to be
in crisis, and when market pressures govern most decisions in the university,
these topics are of central importance.  Is there a unifying model of knowl-
edge (or an “idea of the university”) that unites the humanities, the natural
sciences, and the social sciences?  Are there instead different models of
knowledge for each division of the university?  Or is knowledge, tautologi-
cally, simply what the leading professors in each field declare it to be?  Now
that universities increasingly put themselves forward as “markets in knowl-
edge,” these questions are particularly urgent for the humanities.  Do we sup-
ply any knowledge at all for our customers/students, or just “cultural capital”
with a declining value?
This collection of essays unfortunately does not provide many com-
pelling responses to these questions, and it quickly becomes apparent that
the debate between a science model and an aesthetic or humanistic (and
these are hardly synonymous) model of knowledge is not a major concern for
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most of the contributors.  The real project of this volume is to promote “a
specifically aesthetic way of knowing” (1) against all forms of literary criti-
cism that claim to provide other modes of knowledge.  Science functions
here primarily as the means to attack and discredit the major challenger
within literary studies to an “aesthetic way of knowing”—literary theory.  In
the first of the three sections of the book, “Criticism and the History and
Philosophy of Science,” most of the essays aim to separate literature and sci-
ence by denouncing literary theory as a false bridge between aesthetic expe-
rience and scientific cognition; they also attempt to debunk any claims to
knowledge for literary theory by showing how theorists poach on science yet
fail to meet any of the evidential standards of science (the editors would have
done well to heed the first sentence of Paul Fry’s essay later in the collection
“Literary theory is for the most part a thing of the past”).  Jacques Berthoud,
for example, argues that Lacan’s famous claim that the unconscious is “struc-
tured in the most radical way like a language” (96) has no “scientific” valid-
ity.  What startling news!
Instead of strong, careful arguments exploring the different ways of
knowing between science, literature, and literary criticism, we get the dys-
peptic screeds of the philosopher David Cooper and the geriatrician
Raymond Tallis (the one scientist in the collection) that are supposed to con-
vince us that literary theory is fraudulent and pseudo-scientific.  Tallis argues
that in our weak, prescientific state, literature professors easily fall prey to
“fashions led by charismatics and charlatans,” and accept uncritically “the
evidence-free assertions of the founders of Theory” (75).  His language is
indebted to Max Nordau’s attack on “degeneration” at the time of the last fin
de siecle, and he even suggests that literature professors are primitive crea-
tures, frozen in time (“The contrast, when one moves from clinical science to
Theory, is such that it is difficult to believe the two pursuits belong to the
same stage of evolution of the human species” [78]).  He states that “it has
always been possible to ‘get away with murder’ in a discipline that has no tra-
dition of adequately testing general statements” (75)—the real crime of liter-
ary theorists is venturing beyond their “demesne.”  He argues that we should
go back to producing “narrowly focused” studies of individual works and
refrain from making “large-scale statements” unless we are able to support
them with “properly designed large-scale empirical enquiries” (93—clinical
drug trials are his model for such “evidence-based” enquiries).
David Cooper’s essay serves the same function of censuring literary the-
orists who “soften any sharp contrast between scientific and literary under-
standing” or who make “those ultra-radical pronouncements which in effect
equate science with literary criticism” (67).  His message is that we should
stay on our side of the knowledge divide, and not offer any challenges to
notions of truth, reference, and objectivity (which in his view underpin sci-
entific knowledge) since this would only “sacrifice what is enduring and
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valuable for what is fashionable and meretricious” and would “rubbish the
ordinary and very ancient thinking of the human race” (70).  Leave any chal-
lenges to “ordinary and very ancient thinking” to scientists!
I am not pushing for an eradication of the boundaries between art and
science; only for a thoughtful and genuine consideration of these “different
models of knowledge.” But what happens if we follow the tendency of the
book and, along with Patricia Waugh (one of the co-editors), “resist the easy
seductions of the new scientized aesthetic” (47) (she argues that Jean-
Francois Lyotard [a stand-in for all of postmodern theory] “aestheticizes sci-
ence” by confusing scientific and aesthetic indeterminacy [43]); agree “to
continue some form of the Kantian separation of the categories of knowl-
edge” (43; a careful reading of his Conflict of the Faculties might complicate
the lines of her divisions); and dismiss any challenges that contemporary the-
ory poses to “the existence and value of a specifically aesthetic kind of know-
ing” (50)?  What modes of knowledge do we gain once we return to “the
kinds of understanding of intentional consciousness, of unique experience,
of feeling, of cultural embodiment and value which have traditionally been
the demesne of literary culture” (47)?
The second section, “Criticism and the Aesthetic,” seems to be the real
point of the book: once we have dismissed any aspirations that literary crit-
icism might have to scientific or theoretical knowledge, we can go back (or
forward) to exploring the experience of the aesthetic, the true domain of art
and literature. None of the essays directly take on the project of articulating
the nature of aesthetic experience or of a “specifically aesthetic way of know-
ing” (or for that matter, engage with the vast literature on these topics), but
they often do contain insights about “the experience of literature.” Doris
Lessing provides some intriguing ideas about the difference between writing
novels and autobiographies, and about the continual changes that go on in
both the reader and the writer. David Lodge gives an excellent sketch of the
relationships between literary criticism and literary creation, and some of his
remarks about the “difficulty of understanding the nature of literary creation”
(150) are especially astute.  Paul Fry’s contribution, “Beneath Interpretation,”
more directly addresses the ways in which literature might be a different
mode of knowing, through his claims that “literature is that form of discourse
which is not exhausted by interpretation” (179), and that “what remains in
literature, and only in literature, when interpretation has exhausted meaning
is an underdetermination of predication (I have elsewhere called it the osten-
sive moment of the literary) which not only defies interpretation but consti-
tutes its critique” (166).  This might offer a promising alternative to critics
who promote aesthetic experience as the resistance to interpretation.
Although the essays in this section (by Michael O’Neill and David Fuller
as well) contain fine moments, they certainly do not add up to a grounding
Criticism Vol. 42  No. 3: Book Reviews 379
or an elaboration of a “specifically aesthetic way of knowing.”  Moreover, the
essays suffer when they attempt to promote such a mode of knowledge, as in
each case this is achieved either by embracing forms of not knowing, or by
generalizing a minor example into a universal aesthetic truth.  Doris Lessing
uses a passage from Goethe to promote “a certain passivity in reading taking
what the author is offering, and not what the reader thinks he should be
offering, not imposing himself (herself) between the author and what should
be emanating from the author” (162-63). Taken to the limit, and it seems that
she wishes we do so, aesthetic knowing is to be achieved by repressing all
other forms of knowledge (and Goethe’s injunction “to weigh in what rela-
tion it [a book] stands to our own inner nature” becomes a plea for reading
passively only through a very “active” type of reading). David Fuller, the
other co-editor, goes furthest in this direction, arguing that we “scale down
the pretensions which scholarship and criticism claim for their necessary but
(as Blake puts it) inferior kind of knowing” and “reinstate the thoroughly
interiorized mode of knowledge of the rhapsode” (194).  Fuller appeals for
the restoration of the sacred dimensions of awe, mystery, and intoxication to
the experience of art, but he does not get very far in exploring or conveying
a “superior kind of knowing,” and rests content with such weak conclusions
as “the reader [of a poem] has to strike some relationship between trusting
the words in themselves, being a quasi-anonymous vehicle, while also using
all the resources of feeling and understanding that exist in his or her own
vocal being” (196). Shutting down the Socratic questioning of the rhapsode
(Fuller refers to Plato’s Ion) and retreating inward will not take us very far
along the path of intoxication, knowledge, or ecstasy, which require instead
that we shatter the comforting boundaries of subjectivity. Patricia Waugh
suggests that Virginia Woolf succeeds in combining “the perspective of a par-
ticular person inside the world with an objective view of that same world, the
person and the view included” (she is quoting from Thomas Nagel’s The View
from Nowhere), and that only “in art do we have this kind of experience. and
that is the unique knowledge which it has to offer” (51-52).  Yet Waugh is
unpersuasive both when asserting that Woolf’s “structure” and “metacom-
mentary” provide a “view from nowhere” and when equating this view with
“the world of science” (56); what exceeds any individual perspective is not
necessarily “from nowhere” nor “scientific.”  More importantly, Waugh offers
no support for extending her insights about Woolf’s modernist practice (“the
simultaneous apprehension of experience and the idea of it” [59] experienc-
ing “for ourselves the problem of knowledge” [57]) to all of literature and art.
Much of this book reads like a defense of modernism against postmodern art
and literature; Michael Bell’s “The Metaphysics of Modernism” is another
example.
The one essay to avoid these tendencies of hoping to save literary stud-
ies through some form of retreat—away from science, theory, skepticism,
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postmodernism, and the pressures of contemporary university life—is
Timothy Clark’s “Literature and the Crisis in the Concept of the University,”
the best essay in the collection (from the final section, “Criticism and the
Ethical”). Departing from Bill Readings’s The University in Ruins, Clark
explores the ways “in which English has legitimized itself in relation to both
the university and to society as a whole” (226), and he convincingly argues
that there is no avenue of aesthetic redemption that will save the English
department.  As opposed to Sean Burke (“The Aesthetic, the Cognitive, and
the Ethical”), who responds to “a crisis in our distinctions between the
realms of the aesthetic, cognitive, and the ethical” by promoting his own par-
ticular clan of dialecticians and philosophers who would subject “all prod-
ucts of science . . . to philosophical and ethical interrogation before being
allowed to circulate as discoveries in society at large” (214-15), Clark argues
that “we cannot go back to old and discredited dreams of general cultural
legislation” (235).  In his efforts to rethink the distinctions that have tradi-
tionally structured the university and to conceive a future for literary studies
within “the modern professionalized university,” Clark offers only some pre-
liminary ideas: “a much closer consideration of ways of engaging the media,
and forms of genuine public relations,” “continued de-nationalizing of
Iiterature,” and “general discussion on the idea—or ideas—of the university
as a whole” (236, 237)  Perhaps the editors, in a further attempt to address
the role of literature and literary criticism, will use Clark’s insight that “the
cultural mission of the humanities has become an anachronism” (235) as the
starting point for a new collection of essays.
Jeffrey Wallen
Hampshire College
Origins of Democratic Culture: Printing, Petitions, and the Public Sphere in Early-
Modern England by David Zaret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000.
Pp. xv + 291.  $45.00.
A review by a historian of a book by a sociologist in a journal concerned
with literary and cultural criticism indicates some of the problems and pos-
sibilities of interdisciplinary convergence. Although we share common inter-
ests we are driven by different theoretical concerns, and our recapitulation of
each other’s work exposes us to the risk of being wrong-footed. In this case,
a historian may be inclined to applaud David Zaret’s sociological exploration
of  early modern English political culture, while wishing that he wrote more
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like a historian, knew more about the English past, and had greater curren-
cy with the most recent work in our discipline.
Origins of Democratic Culture makes several interesting arguments. First,
the author observes that conditions of political excitement, energized dis-
course, and commercial printing existed in England a century or more before
their emergence in the classic “public sphere” as imagined by Jürgen
Habermas. English political culture was discursively precocious, and as early
as the 1530s included opinionated interactions among the political classes
and wide-ranging circulation of political news. A century later, on the eve of
the English Revolution, English culture exhibited signs of dialogic maturity,
as gentlemen and commoners, governors and governed, debated matters of
church and state through a variety of scribal and printed media.
Incorporating rumor and gossip, ballads and libels, sermons and pamphlets,
and proclamations and petitions, political discourse spilled across inns and
taverns, courts and counting houses, as well as parliamentary chambers and
courts. But despite the proliferation of print and the widespread circulation
of text, political communication fell short of its democratic potential because
the culture adhered to traditional modes of deference, secrecy, and privilege.
Zaret claims that the peculiar circumstances of the early 1640s trans-
formed this communicative environment, producing the most dramatic
changes of the English Revolution. More significant than short-term and
reversible alterations of the constitution and religion was the novel and per-
manent invention of a politics of public opinion.  The explosion of print that
followed the abandonment of censorship in 1640 led to a new world of pam-
phlets answering pamphlets, text talking to text, and authors of all sorts
exploiting the dialogic possibilities of the press. More works were published
in the revolutionary era 1640-1660 than in the entire previous history of
printing in England.
But this was just the beginning. Key to the transformation that Zaret sees
as the foundation of modern democratic culture was the novel deployment
in the 1640s of printed petitions on matters of national religious and politi-
cal concern. English government was long accustomed to receiving petitions,
nearly always in manuscript, and usually couched in deferential terms. But
beginning in 1640, this traditional mode of address became co-opted by fac-
tional, partisan, and confessional antagonists who used the press and its
attendant mechanisms of merchandising and publicity to appeal to “public
opinion” on behalf of legislative agenda. The Houses of Parliament handled
hundreds of organized petitions between 1640 and 1642 which set the
model for competitive public petitioning during and after the civil wars.
Traditional fictions about secrecy and privilege were jettisoned as petitions
answered and crossed the petitions of rivals, and their circulation in print
appealed explicitly to the rational authority of the citizenry at large.
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Petitioning and printing imposed dialogic order on political conflict, recon-
stituting the public as audience, participants, and consumers. The upshot
was the creation in mid-Stuart England of the first democratic public sphere.
With its overload of signification, its “representational kaleidoscope” (179),
and its “commodification of discursive production” (277),  the culture of
mid-Stuart England, it is suggested, had parallels to our own postmodern
condition.
As a sociologist addressing disciplinary colleagues. Zaret begins with the
obligatory invocation of theory.  Passages acknowledging “T. H. Marshall’s
account,” “Habermas’s analysis,” and the master works of Marx and Weber,
frame brief discussions of bourgeois communicative practice, the underpin-
nings of democracy,  and the emergent public sphere. Most historical sociol-
ogists apparently recognize England as the “modal case,” but few have appre-
ciated the degree to which revisionist historical scholarship has undercut
their position. Historians of the seventeenth century no longer believe in the
Whig rise of liberty, inexorable processes of modernization, or in the revolu-
tionary ideology of puritanism.  Zaret, as an interlocutor between disciplines,
reports the bad news with full bibliographic details. Setting aside the old par-
adigm, he posits the neo-Whig notion that seventeenth-century England
experienced a revolution in communicative practice that opened the way for
a democratic political culture. The very title tells it all. 
Origins of Democratic Culture may provide a valuable reeducation for
sociologists about early modern England, but it has little to teach historians.
Although there are useful discussions here about scribal culture, the printing
trade, and political communication, there is nothing to which historians will
be indebted. The primary sources are familiar materials and the secondary
sources cite the usual suspects. Without a bibliography it is difficult to check
for omissions, but several recent and relevant works appear to have escaped
the author’s attention. Zaret’s discussion of public opinion would be
improved by reference to Dagmar Freist, Governed by Opinion: Politics,
Religion and the Dynamics of Communication in Stuart London, 1637-1645
(London: I. B. Tauris, 1997). And his discussion of petitioning, on which his
central argument depends, needs major modification in light of Judith
Maltby’s Prayer Book and People in Elizabethan and Early Stuart England
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), which includes a compre-
hensive analysis of pro-episcopal petitions of the 1640s. Zaret does appear to
have read Bernard Capp’s The World of John Taylor the Water-Poet, 1578-1653
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) but he persistently misattributes it
to William Lamont (145).  His citation of Broadside Black-Letter Ballads, edit-
ed by J. P. Collier, includes no caution that anything Collier touched may be
contaminated by forgery (115). Zaret’s discussion of literacy levels is brief
and uncomplicated, but includes no reference to the source of the figures he
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quotes (151), namely my own early work, Literacy and the Social Order:
Reading and Writing in Tudor and Stuart England (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1980).
It is curious that this study of communicative practices in the early mod-
ern public sphere contains no reference to the Protestation of 1641, a nation-
wide mobilization of support for the Protestant religion. Yet the circulation
of the Protestation in manuscript and in print, with its parish by parish col-
lection of signatures and endorsements, exemplifies the new politics of pub-
lic opinion, or at least public involvement, that Zaret takes as his theme.
Subsequent attempts to secure widespread subscription to the Vow and
Covenant and Solemn League and Covenant are likewise ignored. More
problematic is the very notion of public opinion. Although frequently
invoked, this key concept is never adequately examined. Who is thought to
constitute the public, and whose voice, whose voices, lie behind the myriad
print productions of the 1640s?  What combination of coercion and oppor-
tunism, wishful thinking and self-interest, thoughtfulness and fickleness,
went into the writing and signing of petitions? What grounds are there for
intimating that any opinions so expressed were rational? Questions of
authorship and readership, production and reception, are notoriously diffi-
cult to pin down, but they deserve a more empirically grounded discussion.
The material cited here can be used to argue for the variety and vitality of
early modern culture, and its remarkable outpourings in the years of revolu-
tion. It can be used, as others have used it, to push back in time the onset of
the public sphere. Whether it can also be used to identify the origins of
democratic culture, and to find them in a revolution in communicative prac-
tices in revolutionary England, remains unproven. Each to his own, but his-
torians would ask different questions.
David Cressy
Ohio State University
Shakespeare and Social Dialogue: Dramatic Language and Elizabethan Letters  by
Lynne Magnusson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.  Pp. x +
221.  $59.95.
Lynne Magnusson’s book, as the Introduction maintains, investigates
“the richly complex rhetoric of social exchange in early modern England”
(1), by way of discourse analysis and linguistic pragmatics, drawing various-
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ly on the work of Pierre Bourdieu, M. M. Bakhtin, and the politeness theory
of Penelope Brown and Stephen C. Levinson. The book is closely argued and
cogently written, “a practical analysis,” as Magnusson puts it, “of how social
relationships are constructed both in dramatic dialogue and in epistolary
exchanges” (7-8). However, because of this problematic division in the mate-
rial it seeks to investigate (letters and dialogue), and because some of the
book's basic assumptions are questionable, the exegesis is only a marginally
successful examination of both Shakespeare’s dramatic language and
Elizabethan letters.
The book comprises, besides an Introduction, seven chapters divided
into three parts. Part I, “The Rhetoric of Politeness,” deals with the language
of positive and negative politeness—the rhetoric of social interaction—in
Henry VIII (ch. 1); it also analyzes the negotiations of the language of service
and power in six Sidney family letters and in Shakespeare’s sonnets 57, 58,
88, 89, and 94 (ch. 2). Part II, “Eloquent Relations in Letters,” investigates
how the letter-writing manuals of Erasmus and Angel Day map and dissem-
inate social “interactional scripts” (ch. 3); examines how courtly and admin-
istrative letters mediate social and verbal relationships (ch. 4); and investi-
gates the influence of merchant letter-writing manuals on socially stratified
language and how they intersect with some of Shakespeare’s dramas (ch. 5).
Part III, “A Prosaics of Conversation,” concerns the maintenance of conver-
sation, social interaction, and identity formation in King Lear and Much Ado
about Nothing (ch. 6); and examines how rhetorical performance—discourse
production and reception—acts as a manipulation of symbolic, linguistic
capital in Othello (ch. 7). Magnusson’s methods of analysis comprise “seeking
common ground between cultural criticism and close reading” in order to
“read the socially situated verbal interaction of [Shakespeare’s] time” (10, 1).
The book falls into two distinct parts: those dispersed chapters which
investigate social dialogue (primarily conversational, linguistic performance in
the plays of Shakespeare), and those chapters which analyze letters (epistolary
texts and letter-writing manuals). How comfortable one is with Magnusson’s
conflation of written and oral categories will define how convincing one finds
the argument. This reviewer did not feel that the awkward and often trou-
blesome conflation of the oral and the written (described in the title as dia-
logue and letters) was either necessary or decisively persuasive.
Magnusson’s overall argument is based on three crucial assumptions: 1)
that face-to-face interaction is the same as that mediated by letters (3, 63, 65,
and passim); 2) that Shakespeare’s dramatic dialogue represents actual, quo-
tidian dialogue (18, 159); and 3) that his drama constitutes a conversational
discourse (27, 29, 155). Such assumptions are questionable, however.
Letters and theater are not the same media, despite the fact that they share
several characteristics; care must be taken when examining them together. To
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support the conflation of the oral and the written, Magnusson applies the
trope which epistolary theorists and manual-writers employ—that letters are
“mutual conversation[s] between absent friends” (3, 63). But it is just that: a
trope of orality transferred to the often uncertain, untrustworthy, and unsta-
ble medium of epistolary communication, a remystification of categories
which insists that letters “are closely related to speech act categories” (65).
Walter Ong’s conception of degrees of “oral residue” informing written and
printed texts is a similar mystification. Moreover, conversational discourse
analysis, that of Brown and Levinson for instance, assumes face-to-face con-
tact, and often does not apply to epistolary interaction, since the letter is a
disembodied mode of communication assuming spatial and temporal dis-
tance between the communicators.
When dealing with epistolarity, the book is not so much about
Elizabethan letters as it is about Elizabethan letter-writing manuals. By my
count, Magnusson puts forth 29 specimens of actual letters or excerpts from
circulated missives, a very small sample which is neither sufficient for a study
on Elizabethan letters, nor inclusive enough for the gestures toward a uni-
versal politeness theory of early modern epistolarity. (The cultural anthro-
pology model serving as the basis of the argument is that of Penelope Brown
and Stephen C. Levinson, Politeness: Some Universals in Language Usage.)
Magnusson’s assumption, of course, is that highly theorized letter-writing
manuals generally represent early modern epistolary practice—indeed they
do, but only to a limited extent. The logic of Magnusson’s assumption short-
circuits discussion and examination of the mass of real early modern letters
which might have been more persuasively employed. In Magnusson’s
defense, however, the massive body of surviving letters from the period is a
problem for any scholarly study of letters; it is difficult if not impossible to
generalize about such an unwieldy genre. Previous studies of letters such as
Claudio Guillén’s “Notes toward the Study of the Renaissance Letter,”
Jonathan Goldberg’s Writing Matter: From the Hands of the English Renaissance,
and Frank Whigham’s “The Rhetoric of Elizabethan Suitors’ Letters” also tend
to this focus on letter-writing manuals. Furthermore, the suggestion that
Shakespeare used letter-writing manuals in composing his plays (3, 12, 118)
is largely unsupported and speculative, and neglects what speech patterns
and linguistic forms Shakespeare may have absorbed from an intensive gram-
mar school education based on the study of rhetoric and on the epistles and
epistolary fictions of classical writers such as Pliny the Younger, Ovid, Cicero,
and Seneca.
I do not wish to suggest, however, that Magnusson does not make sev-
eral astute observations in this book. Some chapters simply work better than
others. The chapter on the Sidney letters and Shakespeare’s sonnets (ch. 2),
for example, is convincing since its analysis adheres to the medium of the
written text: the sonnets of Shakespeare can be usefully studied in the con-
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text of epistolarity since the material media (the letter, the manuscript-
circulated sonnet, as written texts) are exchangeable documents and materi-
al representations of duty, service, and clientage. Likewise, the discussion of
merchant discourse (ch. 5) is persuasive since the letter-writing manuals
Magnusson offers (such as John Browne’s The Marchants Aviso) were meant
especially to teach merchants how to compose business letters, but also
because Magnusson recognizes that “the material condition of market
exchange, with its deferral of face-to-face negotiation” relied almost entirely
upon letters for such exchanges (124). The letter here is acknowledged as an
alternative medium, ontologically distinct from face-to-face communication.
Since essentially half of this relatively brief book is on Shakespeare and
half is on epistolary writing, the exposition feels rather sketchy and disjoint-
ed. For a book whose title suggests that it is primarily about Shakespeare, its
middle chapters (3, 4, most of 5) deal only tangentially with the Bard, mak-
ing some mandatory, but arbitrary, connections back to Shakespeare in their
conclusions. Reorganization could have aided the movement of the exposi-
tion. Chapters 1 and 6, dealing as they do with dramatic dialogue, speech
events, and discourse analysis, are distanced by the intervening chapters; in
addition, the letter-writing manual material might have been more usefully
placed first, as a basis on which analyses of relational and interactional
scripts could have been built. On the whole, Magnusson would have done
better to limit the argument to oral performance and politeness theory/dis-
course analysis, or stick to Elizabethan letters, for there is, indeed, a wealth
of epistolary material to investigate, and Magnusson makes much investiga-
tive headway here. Chapter 4, for example, on business and administrative
letters, intriguingly investigates how power is negotiated through expressions
of affect and friendship, for these state letters frequently work in the context
of the familiar letter; it is also the chapter in which Magnusson presents sev-
eral genuine letters as evidence for the argument. Interestingly, considering
the book’s title, Shakespeare’s dramatic letters, those contained in his plays
and exchanged by their characters, are never considered—a bit puzzling per-
haps since these exist both in the context of dramatic speech performance and
employ the typical generic conventions of the epistle.
Finally, I am pleased to see Magnusson reach forward into an area of
investigation too often ignored. Undeniably, early modern English letters are
the last relatively unexplored literary form; Magnusson has begun to analyze
these texts, as the author notes, “making a beginning at the serious rhetori-
cal study of early modern administrative letters, treating them as texts in
their own right, an agenda suggested by new historicist assertions about the
rhetoricity of historical documents but generally left undeveloped” (4).
Magnusson’s foray into letters requires much supplementation; the vast
archive of early modern epistolary texts awaits much further exploration.
Gary Schneider
Wayne State University
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The Gothic Family Romance: Heterosexuality, Child Sacrifice, and the Anglo-Irish
Colonial Order by Margot Gayle Backus. Durham and London: Duke
University Press, 1999.  Pp. xi + 291. $49.95 cloth; $17.95 paper.
Margot Gayle Backus’s new book, The Gothic Family Romance:
Heterosexuality, Child Sacrifice, and the Anglo-Irish Colonial Order, is a valuable,
provocative interdisciplinary contribution to the fields of Gothic literature,
Irish studies, and contemporary theory. Marshaling a diverse body of critical,
historical, and supporting materials, Backus explores three centuries of writ-
ing and “map[s] out the formation of the nuclear family in relation to the
emergence in British and Anglo-Irish literature of depictions of families and
social orders that . . . covertly devour children” (4). Her focus on “the rela-
tionship of familial reproduction, children’s experiences within families, and
colonial politics” (4) emphasizes what she sees as the autophagous nature of
British and Anglo-Irish social and governmental systems; that is, such sys-
tems secure their power by destroying, literally and figuratively, each gener-
ation of children. Backus briefly discusses the theoretical underpinnings of
her book in the introduction. Carefully drawing together elements of post-
colonial, sociological, psychoanalytic, Marxist, and Gothic scholarship, as
well as queer theory, she points out that this body of work “call[s] our atten-
tion to the many guises in which dominant or authorized accounts are
inevitably haunted by that which they exclude” (13). For Backus, “gothicism
in Ireland clearly affords a privileged site for an investigation into marginal,
suppressed experiences that continue to haunt the Irish symbolic order”
(15). Of particular note is Backus’s adaptation of Freud’s concept of “the neu-
rotic’s family romance” (18). The psychological fantasy in which children
simultaneously imagine that their “real” parents are aristocrats unknown to
them, and conversely, in which they externalize their birth-parents’ failings
onto menacing strangers, takes on an explicitly Gothic shading through
Backus’s reading of Anglo-Irish Gothic literature as “British literary realism’s
‘return of the repressed’” (16). She argues that the political, social, and eco-
nomic position of the Anglo-Irish in relation to Britain inscribes the psycho-
analytic model of the family romance on a national scale. This combination
of postcolonial, Marxist, and psychoanalytic theory serves as the primary
lens through which Backus reads the texts in this far-reaching study.
The first two chapters of Backus’s book lay the necessary groundwork for
her later analysis of Anglo-Irish Gothic literature. Chapter 1 describes the
dense interplay of forces that changed Ireland’s political, social, and eco-
nomic systems and which fostered the Anglo-Irish class. Backus weaves a
complex network from many theoretical and historical threads, which I can
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only sketch here: (1) the rise of a narrow Protestant English nationalism
which subsequently cast the Catholic Irish as the denigrated, vilified Other
against which the Anglo-Irish social order emerged; (2) a shift within Irish
society away from matriarchal, communal social relationships toward patri-
archal, restrictive, atomized structures; (3) the emergence of what Backus
calls “the capitalist family cell” (36), based on Marx’s identification of the
social contract inherent in capitalism and Foucault’s term for enclosed,
nuclear families; and (4) the foregrounding of heterosexuality as the social
norm, combined with a breakdown in extended kinship ties, which gave par-
ents increased control over their children’s sexuality and led to the commod-
ification of children in social relationships. The combination of these changes
provides Backus with a methodological tool with which to read Gothic nar-
ratives allegorically.
In chapter 2 Backus applies her critical framework to Richardson’s
Clarissa, showing how Gothic conventions throughout the novel encode the
changes in familial and social structures taking place throughout the early
eighteenth century. Backus analyzes Richardson’s novel, written contempora-
neously with these changes, to establish the pattern she will examine in later
Anglo-Irish Gothic narratives, which she claims parallel and intensify such an
allegorical reading of Clarissa. Crucial to Backus’s thesis throughout the book
is the attention she draws to “the increasing synchronization of private and
public patriarchal values, as the middle-class family became emblematic of
British national identity, values, and society” (69). This is perhaps Backus’s
most successful chapter, focusing as it does on only one text, from multiple
points of inquiry. Expanding on her use of Foucault, she argues that Clarissa’s
constantly changing subject positions, descending from favored daughter to
corpse, are the result of the Harlowes’ increasingly capitalist, sexually bina-
rized, compulsorily heterosexual, silencing, and ultimately, self-consuming
intrafamilial and social relationships.
Backus explores the core argument of Gothic Family Romance in chapters
3 through 7, demonstrating the various ways in which many Anglo-Irish nar-
ratives engage and magnify the triangular relationship between Gothic con-
ventions, family dynamics, and sociopolitical changes found in Clarissa. In
chapter 3, Backus focuses on works by Swift, Burke, and Edgeworth, three
early Anglo-Irish writers who helped to consolidate their class’ cultural and
social position during a time when that position was still somewhat fluid. By
paying close attention to these writers’ use of irony, she locates Anglo-Irish
anxiety, particularly Anglo-Irish children’s double bind of being neither
“Irish” nor “English,” in the distance that an ironic stance seems to promise,
yet cannot completely maintain. Backus’s model of the “gothic family
romance” illustrates how families in texts such as “A Modest Proposal,”
Reflections on the Revolution in France, and Castle Rackrent sacrifice their future
growth as a means of shoring up their past histories and present conditions.
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If the ironic stances of early Anglo-Irish writers attempt to disclaim, but
ultimately acknowledge, their uncertain familial and social relationships, the
“paranoid gothic” of nineteenth-century writers such as Maturin, Le Fanu,
and Stoker is in full-fledged denial. Chapter 4 details the features which
make Melmoth the Wanderer, “Carmilla,” and Dracula Backus’s “paradigmatic
gothic family romance[s]” whose purpose is “to reincorporate denied feel-
ings, perceptions, and experiences within a story that simultaneously ratio-
nalizes them and categorically denies their relationship to the family” (109).
Specifically, Backus’s interest in these texts centers on the sexual subject for-
mation of their young protagonists, and the efforts by competing institutions
to co-opt those sexual identities for their own purposes. Continuing her alle-
gorical reading of Gothic conventions in Anglo-Irish narratives, Backus
asserts that Anglo-Irish paranoid Gothic serves its constituent class as a
repository for the aspects of Anglo-Irish history and culture which the nine-
teenth-century British social order marginalized but could not completely
silence.
In chapter 5, Backus takes an expansive view of the Gothic tropes of
the devil’s bargain, the demon lover, and the living dead to mark a shift
towards realism in the later Anglo-Irish Gothic narrative, Wilde’s The Picture
of Dorian Gray. Unlike the paranoid Gothic earlier in the century, which
explicitly tried to project its fears onto demonized, usually foreign, Others,
Wilde’s Gothic realism is deliberately recognizable as part of contemporary
society, whose typically secret machinations are rendered explicit. Building
on her analysis of Wilde, Backus then looks at the Gothic qualities of sever-
al Anglo-Irish narratives of World War I: Yeats’s “A Rose of Shadow,” Bowen’s
“The Demon Lover,” McGuinness’s Observe the Sons of Ulster Marching toward
the Somme, and Johnston’s How Many Miles to Babylon? Throughout the texts
in this chapter, Backus draws parallels between the contested social spaces of
British male homosexual, and Anglo-Irish, identities.
Backus returns in chapter 6 to a topic she discussed briefly in connec-
tion with Edgeworth, the Anglo-Irish Big House narrative. After an initial
reading of Yeats’s Purgatory, Backus traces the ambiguous, conflicted status of
Anglo-Irish women in novels by Murdoch, Bowen, Keane, and Jacob, high-
lighting the differences in the Big House tradition that result from women’s
disparate social position. According to Backus, these novels, which feature
the burning of aristocratic, ancestral homes, record the destructive familial
and social forces that Anglo-Irish Gothic realism can no longer contain.
Burning the Big Houses, Backus argues, “represents the only possible end to
intergenerational cycles of exploitation and abuse perpetuated by the inter-
generational denial of colonial appropriation within the settler colonialist
order” (213). Backus sees a kind of hope in these novels, especially Bowen’s
and Murdoch’s, that destroying the entrenched Anglo-Irish domestic space
might generate alternate, more liberating, possibilities for women.
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McGuinness’s Baglady and Johnston’s The Invisible Worm are the basis for
Backus’s broadened examination in chapter 7 of Anglo-Irish Gothic realism,
in which she uses the Gothic trope of the incest survivor to read the female
characters in these two texts as allegorical representations of Ireland. Both as
daughters of Anglo-Irish society and culture and as women capable of pro-
ducing children to support the future of those systems, the Baglady and
Laura are subjected to the greater desires of the familial and social relation-
ships which define them, and which later reject them as tainted because of
the incest they suffer. As Backus points out, McGuinness associates the
Baglady with Mother Ireland through the particular image of the grieving
Virgin Mary which was prevalent in Ireland after the Famine; Johnston uses
imagery from Blake’s “The Sick Rose” to equate Laura with Yeats’s image of
the rose of Ireland. Both the Baglady and Laura simultaneously embody and
resist the meanings imposed on them by family, society, and history, and each
takes a decisive action to break the cycle of self-consuming Gothic family
romance. In Johnston’s work in particular, Backus sees this cycle ending
through Laura’s refusal to repeat the sins of her parents, and in her breaking
the silence about those sins perpetrated against her.
The Gothic Family Romance: Heterosexuality, Child Sacrifice, and the Anglo-
Irish Colonial Order is generally successful in its ambition to canvass a het-
erogeneous group of British and Anglo-Irish texts through a multifaceted,
nuanced critique. Backus skillfully weaves her theoretical models into a uni-
fied approach, avoiding the haphazard effect that might have resulted from
combining several lines of criticism. A side effect of its ambition, however, is
a sense that only Clarissa receives the full, detailed attention that Backus’s
sophisticated methodology requires. Every chapter has several subdivisions,
and in each of two central chapters, Backus discusses five texts. These trun-
cated sections, combined with Backus’s frequently jargon-laden prose style,
create a telescoped review in places where a more extended analysis might
better serve Backus’s overall study. By relegating to footnotes several state-
ments about her use of the term “Anglo-Irish” instead of making them an
explicit part of the contested territory she surveys, Backus risks conflating
the shifting uses of this term over time, especially regarding contemporary
writers such as McGuinness and Johnston. A noticeable omission in Backus’s
book is a specific discussion about what she sees as particularly “Gothic”
about the tropes she selects, other than their frequent recurrence in the
canon of Gothic literature. Such a discussion would add a helpful context to
the divergent, and at first glance arbitrary, list of texts Backus covers. The
strengths of Backus’s study far outweigh these minor flaws, however. Setting
a high standard for future interdisciplinary projects, Gothic Family Romance is
a compelling study that will become an important book in Gothic criticism,
Irish studies, and postcolonial studies.
Kellie Donovan Wixson
Tufts University
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